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Market work per person is roughly 10 percent higher in the U.S. than in Sweden. However, if we
include the work carried out in home production, the total amount of work only diﬀers by 1 percent.
I set up a model with home production, and show that diﬀerences in policy - mainly taxes - can
account for the discrepancy in labor supply between Sweden and the U.S. Moreover, even though
the elasticity of labor supply is rather low for individual households, labor taxes are estimated to be
associated with considerable output losses. I also show that policy can account for the falling trend
in market work in Sweden since 1960. The largest reduction occurs from 1960 until around 1980,
both in the model and the data. After the early 1980s, the trends for both taxes and actual hours
worked are basically ﬂa t .T h i si sa l s ot r u ef o rh o u r sw o r k e di nt h em o d e l .
JEL Classiﬁcation D13 H24 J22
Keywords: Labor supply, taxes, home production
International comparisons highlight quite large diﬀerences in the extent of market work across OECD
countries. Fig. 1 below displays the average annual work hours across a subset of countries. I only ﬁnd
European countries at the lower and non-European countries at the higher end.1 The diﬀerence between
these ends is larger than 400 hours per year, that is, on average, people in New Zealand work 43 percent
more than workers in Italy.2
∗Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm Sweden, e-mail: conny@iies.su.se.
I am grateful for comments from Kjetil Storesletten, Mats Persson, Jeremy Greenwood, Edward Prescott, Assar Lindbeck
and seminar participants at IIES, Stockholm School of Economics, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, and
Department of Economics, Stockholm University. Thanks to Annika Andreasson and Christina Lönnblad for editorial
assistance. Financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation is greatly acknowledged.
1The data is for 2002 and is taken from the OECD Labor database. There are basically two reasons why I am focusing
on people aged between 20-64. First of all, this is the population examined in the Swedish time use surveys. Second, the
conﬂict of how to allocate the total amount of work time between market work and domestic work seems most relevant for
people of these ages.
2A natural objection to the above data may be that these diﬀerences could be driven by the quite low level of employment
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Figure 1: AVERAGE ANNUAL HOURS OF MARKET WORK PER PERSON (20-64)
Theoretical explanations for these diﬀerences could, for instance, be cross-country heterogeneity in
preferences, labor taxes, beneﬁts or any other factor inﬂuencing the incentives to supply labor. Matching
the data with assumptions of heterogeneity in preferences is probably quite easy. This is worth noting, but
too obvious to really be of interest. More challenging are questions about actual policy such as that dealt
with in this paper: Could the diﬀerences in Fig.1 have been generated by cross-country heterogeneity
in policy? Policy will be more explicitly deﬁned below, but taxes will be the main policy instrument of
analysis and I will concentrate on Sweden and the U.S. The reason for focusing on these two countries
is that, to some extent, they represent polar extremes. Among the OECD countries, the U.S. has the
second highest level of market work per person, in combination with a very low tax burden.3 Sweden,
on the other hand, has the highest tax burden and a much lower level of market work.4
The problem in explaining diﬀerences in labor supply by cross-country heterogeneity in labor taxes, is
3By tax burden I mean total tax revenue as a share of GDP (OECD Revenue statistics 2003). For the OECD countries,
only Japan, Mexico and Korea have a lower tax burden than the U.S.
4Still, Sweden is at the upper end among the European countries, indicating that taxes alone cannot explain the
diﬀerences. It has been pointed out that, besides taxes, the way the government uses its revenue may actually have a strong
inﬂuence on the level of labor supply (see Lindbeck (1982) and Rogerson (2003b)). A feature of the model introduced in
the next section is that labor supply is increasing in government consumption. As a result, the model will also, at least
qualitatively, be consistent with Sweden’s relatively high level of labor supply.
2that the eﬀect of labor taxation in standard models may generally be ambiguous. In particular, income
and substitution eﬀects often work in opposite directions, making the total eﬀect sensitive to the chosen
calibration. Moreover, as shown later in this paper, for a calibration of the model consistent with micro
data, the net eﬀect will generally not be suﬃciently large to account for diﬀerences in labor supply of the
magnitude displayed in Fig.1.
This paper takes into account the fact that households carry out a substantial amount of work outside
their workplaces, mainly in home production. In Sweden, a working household devotes on average 44
percent of its total working time (consisting of market work and home production) to home production.
The relation between the average annual hours of paid and unpaid work in Sweden and the U.S. is













Figure 2: ANNUAL HOURS OF PAID AND UNPAID WORK
Market work per person is roughly 10 percent (more than 120 hours) higher in the U.S. than in
Sweden, corresponding to 3 weeks of full time work per person and year, which is a substantial number.
However, what is also displayed in Fig. 2 is that average total work only diﬀers by 1 percent (or less than
3three quarters of a week of full time work).5 The diﬀerence seems to be that Swedes allocate a larger
share of their total work eﬀort to home production.
Examples of services produced in home production are child care, cleaning, shopping, preparing dinner
but also repairs of household goods and vehicles. In most cases, households also have the option of buying
these services on the market. A household’s choice between buying and producing services will therefore
generally depend on the price of market-produced services, and its productivity in market work relative
to its productivity in home production. Taxes may distort this choice in two signiﬁcant ways.6 First,
service taxes (VAT) raise the price of market-produced services, making them a less attractive deal.
Second, labor taxes distort the household’s time allocation choice between working in the market and
in home production. Basically, labor taxes reduce the return to market work and increase the return to
home production in relative terms. As a result, households subject to labor taxes may start allocating
their time to home production instead of market work, even though their productivity may be lower in
the former activity than in the latter. Their allocation of total work between market work and home
production will no longer be governed by the law of comparative advantage but - in the words of Davis
& Henrekson (2001) - by the tax distorted law of comparative advantage.
In addition to taxes, I analyze the implications of the variance in the wage distribution for aggregate
labor supply. This variance may be expected to aﬀect the demand for market-produced services, since
compressed wages may impel high-productivity households to substitute market-produced for home-
produced services. As a result, market work will decrease.
Naturally, a legitimate question is whether we should actually care about cross-country diﬀerences in
the hours worked? My answer is that it is important to understand whether the observed numbers could
have been generated by economic incentives. GDP per capita was 31 percent higher per person aged
5The data on market work is for 2002, and is once more taken from the OECD Labor database. The data on home
production in Sweden is based on the estimate that Swedish households devote, on average, 44 percent of their total
working time to domestic work. This relation has actually been quite robust over time (Juster & Staford (1991) and Tid för
Vardagsliv. Kvinnors och mäns tidsanvändning 1990/91 och 2000/2001 (2003)). For the U.S., the data on home production
is taken from Juster & Staford (1991), wherein it is reported that Americans devote, on average, 39.4 percent of their total
working time to domestic work. The Swedish data in Juster & Staford (1991) is claimed to match the U.S. classiﬁcation
scheme. However, the numbers must be treated with some caution. The reason is that the data is generally for men and
women aged between 20-64, except for the data in Juster & Staford (1991), which is for men and women aged 25-64.
6By now, it is quite well known that taxes may be somewhat more distortionary in the presence of home production; see,
for example, Lindbeck (1981), McGrattan et al (1993), Pålsson (1997), Henrekson (1998) and Davis & Henrekson (2001).
420-64 in the U.S. than in Sweden in the year 2002.7 There certainly exists a need to evaluate to what
extent this diﬀerence can be accounted for by the fact that Swedes spend more time in home production
where, on average, they are less productive.
To test the hypothesis that diﬀerences in labor supply are driven by cross-country heterogeneity in
policy, I set up a dynamic general equilibrium model consisting of many households with three arguments
in their utility function: consumption goods, services and leisure. Services may be bought at the market,
or produced in home production.8 Households are assumed to be heterogenous in labor productivity and,
on average, their productivity will be higher in market work than in home production. The assumption
of heterogeneity allows me to analyze the eﬀects of wage dispersion. Households in the model must thus
allocate their income between consumption goods and market-produced services, and their time between
market work, home production and leisure.
The model is calibrated to match a number of Swedish features, such as time spent in market work and
home production. A key parameter here is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, calibrated to be less than
0.5 in accordance with empirical estimates.9 Another important parameter in the model, governing a
household’s choice between market-produced and home-produced services, is the elasticity of substitution
between these two objects. To estimate this elasticity, I use Swedish data on spending and estimate the
fraction of total expenditures of Swedish households on market-produced services as a function of their
disposable income. The elasticity is found to be 1.33, implying market-produced and home-produced
services to be close to perfect complements.10 This low elasticity supports the widespread notion among
Swedes that even high-productivity households choose to engage a great deal in home production, instead
of buying market-produced services. Policy parameters, such as taxes, wage dispersion and government
consumption are set to their Swedish 2002 estimates. Finally, the policy parameters are changed to U.S.
data to explore whether the model matches U.S. hours in market work and home production.
It is found that the model matches time spent in both market work and in home production, very well.
7Data on PPP adjusted GDP from the OECD Statistical Database.
8This assumption separates this paper somewhat from earlier macro research on home production. See, for instance,
McGrattan (1993); Greenwood et al (1994); and Klein and Jonsson (2003). An exception is Rios-Rull (1993).
9The Frisch is deﬁned as the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wage, holding the marginal utility of consumption
constant. The standard assumption in the literature on the eﬀect of taxes on labor supply, is log utility in leisure. This
implies that the Frisch elasticity roughly ranges between 1 and 4. This may be true for the aggregate, but at the micro
level, this elasticity is estimated to be in the interval [0,0.5]. See Browning et al (1999) for a survey.
10Which they would be if the elasticity were 1.
5The model predicts the GDP per capita to be 12 percent higher in the U.S. than in Sweden as a result
of diﬀerent policies. These results show that Swedish policy heavily inﬂuences the choice between home
production and market work. The distortion comes from taxes in general, and labor taxes in particular.
Even though the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is rather low in the model, labor taxes generate a
substantial output loss. In fact, the model predicts that the Swedish GDP per capita would increase by
almost 27 percent as a result of changing to U.S. tax rates (i.e, while holding other policy parameters
constant). This is a huge number, roughly equal to 6800 dollars/person (denominated in 2001 prices).
The value added tax on services is found to be the least distortionary among the set of taxes analyzed
in this paper. Reducing service taxes in Sweden from the present level of 25 to 0 percent would, according
to the model, only slightly increase output (by 3 percent). This mild distortion is due to the low elasticity
of substitution between market-produced and home-produced services.
A higher degree of wage dispersion is found to decrease market work, increase home production and
slightly reduce output. The reason is that a higher dispersion enhances the incentive to supply labor
for high-productivity households, while it is reduced for low-productivity households. The net eﬀect
is negative, but the fall in GDP per capita stemming from the smaller work eﬀort of low-productivity
households, is almost completely oﬀset by the increased work eﬀort of high-productivity households.
The model is also consistent with the falling trend in hours worked since 1960. The largest reduction
occurs from 1960 until around 1980, both in the model and in the data. After the early 1980s, the trends
for both taxes and hours worked are basically ﬂat. This is also true for hours worked in the model.
However, the model clearly overestimates the number of hours worked between 1960 and 1975.
Several recent related studies are analyzing the causes of labor supply, but they all diﬀer from this
paper in several important aspects. For instance Davis and Henrekson (2001), do not have a quanatitative
approach. Neither Prescott (2003) nor Rogerson (2003a, b) consider heterogeneity in labor productivity
(which may be important for the way an economy allocates time across market and nonmarket activities).
Finally, Nickell (2003) concentrates on empirical ﬁndings concerning the eﬀects of taxes and labor market
institutions on the labor supply. Maybe most important, this paper is one of the ﬁrst to incorporate an
elasticity of labor supply consistent with micro estimates.
61T H E M O D E L
1.1 CONSUMERS
Consider an economy with a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households. The instantaneous utility for
















where cit is consumption goods, sit services and lit leisure.11 Households can either buy services at the
market or produce them themselves at home, i.e. in home production. For simplicity, the production
function for services is assumed to be a linear function of eﬃciency hours  hphit,hp of work only.
fS ( hphit,hp)= hphit,hp,( 2 )
where hit,hp is the time household i devotes to home production and  hp the productivity in that activity.
I assume all households to have the same constant productivity in home production, i.e. that  hp =  hp.









Households supply labor to the labor market, consisting of the goods market and the service sector.
We may consider this economy as one where households work some hours in the goods market and some
in the service sector, so that the total amount of labor supply hit,e q u a l shit,g + hit,s.
I abstract from earnings uncertainty by assuming each household to be endowed with a constant,
but heterogenous level of labor productivity  i = eξi,w h e r eξ is a permanent component assumed to
be normally distributed with the mean zero and the variance σ2
ξ. Each household also has one unit of
productive time per week, which must be divided between labor, home production and leisure
11As a starting point, I have assumed a Cobb-Douglas function for consumption goods and services. Naturally, this
implies that they are perfect complements.
7hit + hit,hp + lit =1 . (4)
For households to be indiﬀerent between working in the goods sector and the service sector, the wage
r a t em u s tb et h es a m ei nt h o s et w os e c t o r s ,i . e . wt,g = wt,s = wt. Denoting taxes on consumption,
























+( 1+rt)ait + ψt, (5)
where ait+1 is the assets the household chooses to hold for the next period, pt the market price of services,
rt the interest rate, wt the wage rate in period t and ψt a transfer from the government.12 Finally, it will
be assumed that households cannot short-sell any assets13
ait+1 ≥ 0,h it ≥ 0,s it,m ≥ 0,h it,hp ≥ 0.( 6 )
Let β denote the subjective discount factor. The households’ maximization problem is then to maxi-






subject to (4), (5) and (6).
Finally, let χ(a,ξ) be the measure of households, and normalize the mass of households to unity.
1.2 FIRMS
The production side of the economy consists of goods and services. There is no aggregate uncertainty in
the economy. Let Kt denote the period t aggregate capital stock, and Ht,g the aggregate labor supply
in eﬃciency units in the goods market, i.e. Ht,g =
Z
 (ξ)hg (a,ξ)dχ. The aggregate production of
12Due to the fact that households do not face any uncertainty, the distribution of wealth will depend on the initial
wealth distribution. Chatterjee (1994) shows that in this type of model, the main properties of the wealth distribution are
self-perpetuating and that people do not move from one economic level to another. That is, if all households hold the same
wealth today, they will also hold the same wealth tomorrow.
13It is not important that the shortselling restriction for asset holdings binds at zero.




t,g .( 7 )
Moreover, let Ht,s be the aggregate labor supply in eﬃciency units in the service sector, i.e. Ht,s =
Z
 (ξ)hs (a,ξ)dχ. According to (2), the aggregate production of market-produced services is then given
by Ht,s.
Firms are assumed to maximize their proﬁt, while taking prices as given. Moreover, in a given period,




Let Ct denote the period t aggregate consumption of goods and St,m the aggregate demand for market-
produced services, i.e. Ct =
Z
c(a,ξ)dχ,a n dSt,m =
Z











t Ct + θ
S
t ptSt,m.( 8 )
The government consumes a portion, Gt, and then makes a lump-sum transfer, Ψt,b a c kt oa l l
households. For simplicity, government consumption is assumed to be useless. Moreover, the government










t Ct + θ
S
t ptSt,m − Gt = Ψt.( 9 )
It has been pointed out that, besides taxes, the way the government uses its revenue may actually have
as t r o n gi n ﬂuence on the level of labor supply.15 For instance, the relatively high level of labor supply
in the Scandinavian countries, may to some extent be due to the fact that Scandinavian governments
spend a relatively larger fraction of their money on child care (which is likely to stimulate labor supply).
This mechanism will actually be present in the model, in an indirect way. Notice from (9) that beneﬁts
14This is a natural benchmark, since the analysis will mainly concentrate on steady states.
15See Lindbeck (1982) and Rogerson (2003b).
9are decreasing in government consumption (i.e., holding tax revenues constant). Lower beneﬁts will then
increase the incentive to supply labor. In this way, the model will, at least qualitatively, be consistent
with Sweden’s relatively high level of labor supply among the European countries.
2 EQUILIBRIUM








. An equilibrium for this economy is then given by
(i) decision rules for agents’ asset holdings ait+1 = b a0 (ai,t,ξi;p,r,w,Θ,Ψ), demand for market-produced
services sit,m = s(ai,t,ξi;p,r,w,Θ,Ψ), hours of work in the service sector hit,s = hs (ai,t,ξi;p,r,w,Θ,Ψ),
hours of work in the goods market hit,g = hg (ai,t,ξi;p,r,w,Θ,Ψ); (ii) aggregate values for asset hold-
ings A(p,r,w,Θ,Ψ)=
R
b a0 (ai,t,ξ)dχ, the demand for market-produced services Sm (p,r,w,Θ,Ψ)=
R
s(ai,t,ξ)dχ,t h el e v e lo fe ﬃciency units of labor supplied to the service sector Hs (p,r,w,Θ,Ψ)=
R
hs (ai,t,ξ)dχ and the goods sector Hg (p,r,w,Θ,Ψ)=
R
hg (ai,t,ξ)dχ such that the following condi-
tions hold:
• The decision rules solve households’ maximization problem
• Households are indiﬀerent between working in the goods market and the service sector, i.e.
ws = wg = w. (10)
• Factor markets clear
r = FK (K,Hg) − δ (11)
wt,g = FHg (K,Hg) (12)
p = w, (13)
10where (13) can be obtained from the fact that proﬁt in the service sector must be zero.
• Tax revenues equal government expenses, i.e. equation (9) holds
• The aggregate supply of savings is equal to ﬁrms’ demand for capital,
A(p,r,w,Θ,Ψ)=K (p,r,w,Θ,Ψ). (14)
• The demand for services equals the supply
Sm (p,r,w,Θ,Ψ)=HS (p,r,w,Θ,Ψ). (15)
Equation (13) can easily be derived from the proﬁt maximization problem faced by ﬁrms in the service
sector.
3 Computation of equilibrium
The computation of the steady state is very standard. Fix the tax rate and guess on K,H and Hs,
with Hg = H − Hs. Compute prices, r,w,p and transfers, Ψ. Solve the households’ problems. Check if
aggregate savings are equal to the aggregate demand for capital, and if the implied labor supply equals
the guess. Otherwise, update the guess and start again.
4 Calibration
My ﬁrst goal is to calibrate the model to match a number of Swedish features. On the production side,
standard values are used for the parameters, namely α =0 .3; δ =0 .08. The preference parameters
are β,γ,µ,η, ϕ,a and b.Is e tβ =0 .96 in order to generate an interest rate at around 4 percent. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is set to 0.5 (which implies γ =2 ), and parameter
µ is set to 5, which implies that, on average, the intertemporal (Frisch) elasticity of substitution for labor
11will be equal to 0.48.16 These elasticities are within the range of the existing estimates.17
Parameter η is quite tricky to pin down, because it determines the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and services (both home produced and market produced), which is a non-observable number.
Instead, I set out to match the fact that Swedes spend more than 3 times more of their disposable income
on goods than on (market-produced) services.18 Is e tη =0 .5410, which generates a ratio around 3.2.
The weight parameter on leisure, ϕ, is set to match the average hours of market work. For Sweden,
the average hours of market work are 23.88 hours per week (see table 3 below) and the implied value for
ϕ is 0.895. The productivity parameter,  hp, is calibrated to match the hours worked in home production.
For Sweden, the relationship between market work and home production is very stable in all three studies:
Swedes devote approximately 56 percent of their total working time to market work and 44 percent to
home production. To match this, I calibrate the model so that "the model Swedes" devote 18.76 hours
per week to home production. I set  hp =0 .43E [ it].19
A key parameter governing a household’s choice between market-produced and home-produced ser-
vices is b, since the elasticity of substitution between these two goods is 1
1−b. For example if b =1 ,
then sit,m and sit,hp are perfect substitutes, and if b =0 ,t h e nsit is a Cobb-Douglas function of sit,m
and sit,hp, so that they are complements. In order to pin down b and a, I estimated (using a simple
OLS-regression) the fraction of total expenditures households spend on market-produced services as a
function of their disposable income.20 a and b are then set to match the intercept and the slope of the
estimated function.21 The implied values are b =0 .25,a n da =0 .3835.





S =0 .25. The parameter σ2
ξ, determining the degree of wage dispersion, is calibrated with estimates
from Flodén and Lindé (2001). For Sweden, they ﬁnd that σ2
ξ =0 .143.22 Government consumption, G,
is set to 25.7 percent of GDP, which is the value reported in European Economy (2000), table 61b.
16The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is deﬁned as the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage keeping the





17See Browning et al (1999) for a survey.
18See SOU (1997), table 3.16. I have excluded house rents from private consumption.
19In the model, E [ it]=1 .0743.
20The data, which is taken from Utgiftsbarometern 2001 (2002), table 6, is denoted for deciles. Once more, I excluded
house rents.
21a determines the intercept and b the slope.
22I thus view wage dispersion as a policy instrument. Admittedly, this is a somewhat crude way of capturing the ambition
of some unions in Europe to compress wages.
12Once the model is calibrated to Sweden, I am ready to test the hypothesis that diﬀerences in labor
supply are driven by cross-country heterogeneity in policy. As stated above, this is done by re-calibrating
all policy parameters so that they are consistent with U.S. data. At the same time, all preference and
production parameters are kept constant.
Taxes for the U.S. are set to θ
P =0 .138; θ
I =0 .2015; θ
C =0 .0825;θ
S =0 .23 The estimate
for σ2
ξ, is once more taken from Flodén and Lindé (2001), where they ﬁnd that σ2
ξ =0 .375.U . S .
government consumption, G, is set to 14.1 percent of GDP.24 Finally, some assumptions regarding the
wealth distribution are needed. I assume the distribution of wealth to be the same in both countries, and
that the fraction of wealth held by the respective quintile is
·
0. 0 1. 0 8. 1 9. 7 2
¸
.25
To sum up, the parameters in table 1 are kept constant throughout the analysis, while the policy
parameters in table 2 are changed.
Table 1: Preference parameters
βγ µϕ a b η α δ   hp
0.96 2 5 0.895 0.3835 0.25 0.541 0.3 0.08 0.43E [ it]






ξ G (SHARE OF GDP)
SWEDEN 0.3292 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.143 0.257
U.S. 0.138 0.2015 0.0825 0 0.375 0.141
The target numbers are summarized in table 3 below. The data is the same as in Fig.2, except that the
23The employer is subject to a 7.65 percent Social Security and Health Insurance tax. In addition, the employer has to
pay unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation, generating a total payroll tax of 13.8 percent. The employee
pays 10 percent in federal income taxes (a household with two workers), and a 7.65 percent Social Security and Health
Insurance tax. In addition, the employee pays 2.5 percent in state and local income taxes. The above tax rates are based
on Schneider (2002) and Stansel (1998). The average sales tax on goods in the U.S. combining state, county and municipal
levels was 8.25 percent in 1998. In most states, sales taxes on services are zero (see Isaacson & Bertoni (2000)).
Moreover, with the above tax rates, the total tax on labor in the U.S. (payroll taxes plus income taxes plus consumption
taxes), is very close to the estimate reported in Nickell (2003).
24European Economy (2000), table 61b.
25The distribution is slightly adjusted, to make it consistent with the short-selling constraint. (See, for instance, Domeij
and Klein (1998)). The assumption of equally distributed wealth is not at all restrictive. Using more realistic distributions
does not aﬀect the results in any signiﬁcant way. I also carry out a sensitivity analysis for wealth distribution in the
Appendix.
13annual numbers are divided by 5200 (52 weeks times 100 productive hours per week), and then multiplied
by 100 to obtain the percentage terms. In this way, the numbers both express hours in percent and hours
per week.
Table 3: Actual Hours Worked in Percent
SWEDEN U.S.
MARKET WORK 23.88 26.18
HOME PRODUCTION 18.76 17.02
GDP/CAPITA 1 1.31
5 Steady State Results
As the title says, all results in this section are steady-state analyses implying that all variables are constant
over time.
5.1 A Model Without Services
A useful benchmark here is the eﬀects of labor taxes in a model with no service sector and no home
production. Standard micro theory tells us that lower income taxes will generate a substitution eﬀect
a n da ni n c o m ee ﬀect. Since these two eﬀects often go in opposite directions, it is generally not obvious
whether a household wants to increase or decrease its labor supply in response to the new tax.
In this subsection, I analyze whether labor taxes (i.e. θ
P and θ
I) can explain the observed diﬀerence





U.S. =0 ). Government consumption, however, is changed in order not to make counterfactual
assumptions about transfers.
The result is presented in table 4. It shows that even though taxes and beneﬁts are lower in the
U.S. than in Sweden, labor supply is predicted to be lower in the U.S., implying that the income eﬀect
dominates the substitution eﬀect with the chosen calibration.26 Moreover, the eﬀect is much too small.
26It is quite easy to analytically derive that this will be the case in a static environment whenever γ>1.
14Table 4: Hours Worked in the Data and the Model Without Services (in Percent)
DATA MODEL
SWEDEN U.S. SWEDEN U.S.
MARKET WORK 23.88 26.18 23.88 23.10
GDP/CAPITA 1 1.31 1 .97
Even if the substitution eﬀect had dominated, the average labor supply would still not even have come
close to the observed value of 26.18, due to the low Frisch elasticity of labor supply in the model.
The result from this exercise basically conﬁrms what was said in the introduction about standard
models generally having a problem explaining diﬀerences in labor supply with cross-country heterogeneity
in taxes. Let me now turn to my model with services and home production.
5.2 The Model With Services
5.2.1 Changing All Policy Parameters
In this section, the model with services and home production is used to explore whether heterogeneity
in policy can explain the diﬀerence in labor supply between Sweden and the U.S. As a starting point,
all policy parameters are changed simultaneously (their separate eﬀects are analyzed in the subsequent
sections). The result is presented in table 5.27
The model is clearly quite successful in replicating the data. It matches the time spent in market
work and home production very well. In addition, it gets both the direction and the magnitude of the
labor supply to be of the right order. Market work in the model only exceeds that in the U.S. by 3.78
percent, whereas the estimate for home production undershoots the data by 6 percent, corresponding to
approximately 49 hours/year, or 8 minutes/day.
Finally, the model quantiﬁes the output loss to be 12 percent, i.e. GDP per capita is quantiﬁed to be
12 percent higher in the U.S. than in Sweden, as a result of diﬀerent policies. However, even though the
27GDP/capita adjusted is given by GDP/capita plus the amount of home-produced services evaluated at the market
price.
15Table 5: Hours Worked in the Data and the Model With Services (in Percent)
DATA MODEL
SWEDEN U.S. SWEDEN U.S.
MARKET WORK 23.88 26.18 23.88 27.17
HOME PRODUCTION 18.76 17.02 18.76 16.07
GDP/CAPITA 1 1.31 1.00 1.12
GDP/CAPITA ADJUSTED - - 1.19 1.30
model can explain a fraction of the diﬀerence in GDP per capita between Sweden and the U.S., it still
leaves a large share unexplained. Let us now go deeper and disentangle which policy instrument drives
these results.
5.2.2 Analyzing Policy Instruments Separately
In the above experiment, all policy parameters were changed at the same time. To analyze their individual
importance, the policy instruments are treated separately in this section. The result is shown in table
6. The ﬁrst column is once more the benchmark case Sweden. The second column shows the eﬀect of
changing government consumption only, i.e., 20.74 would be the number of hours worked in the market
if Sweden would have the same level of government consumption as the U.S., while keping all the other
policy parameter at their Swedish levels. Consequently, the third column shows the eﬀect of changing
wage dispersion only and the fourth the eﬀect of changing taxes only.
Table 6: Analysing Policy Instruments Separately
SWEDEN U.S. G U.S. PRODUCTIVITY U.S. TAXES
MARKET WORK 23.88 20.74 22.18 31.25
HOME PRODUCTION 18.76 20.25 20.30 13.83
GDP/CAPITA 1 .88 .99 1.27
GDP/CAPITA ADJUSTED 1.2 1.08 1.20 1.43
16Table 6 shows a very clear result: the dominating eﬀect is from taxes. In this model, taxes evidently
have the capacity of highly distorting the choice between home production and market work. Moreover,
a considerable output loss is associated with this distortion: GDP per capita is 27 percent (26.52, to be
exact) higher in the economy with U.S. than with Swedish taxes. This is a substantial number, roughly
equal to 6800 dollars/person (denominated in 2001 prices).
Changing government spending decreases both market work and GDP per capita. As discussed above,
it follows from the government budget constraint (9) that reducing government spending, while keeping
taxes ﬁxed, implies increased transfers. This, in turn, reduces the incentive to work, mainly for low-
productivity households.
Changing the wage dispersion decreases market work and increases home production. However, no
major output loss is associated with such a switch. The reason for this should be that a higher disper-
sion enhances the incentive to supply labor for high-productivity households (they are facing a higher
return to labor), while it is reduced for low-productivity households (they are facing a lower return to
labor). The net eﬀect is negative, but the fall in GDP per capita stemming from the lower work eﬀort of
low-productivity households is almost completely oﬀset by the increased work eﬀort of high-productivity
households. This result indicates that heterogeneity in productivity does not really constitute an expla-
nation.28
5.2.3 Analyzing Taxes Separately
In order to evaluate the quantitative importance of each of the diﬀerent taxes, their separate eﬀects are
shown in table 7. Once more, the second column shows the eﬀect of changing labor taxes only and so on.
Both wage dispersion and government consumption are set to Swedish data.
Once more, there is a very clear result: labor taxes really distort the choice between working in the
market and at home. The output loss associated with distortionary labor taxes is again substantial: GDP
per capita is 17 percent higher with U.S. than with Swedish labor taxes.
The quite modest distortion associated with service taxes is somewhat surprising. Service taxes would
28However, it is important to understand that the result stems from the low value of b.M o r e o v e r , b is estimated in
Sweden but may, in practise, be higher in the U.S.






MARKET WORK 23.88 28.30 25.60 25.13
HOME PRODUCTION 18.76 15.81 17.58 17.74
GDP/CAPITA 1 1.17 1.07 1.03
GDP/CAPITA ADJUSTED 1.2 1.36 1.24 1.21
probably be expected to have the potential to heavily distort the choice between buying and producing
services. The mild distortion in the model is due to the implied elasticity of substitution between market-
produced and home-produced services being rather low (slightly above 1). In reality, services diﬀer and
the elasticity of substitution will be substantially higher for some services than for others (it is inﬁnite
for perfect substitutes). A higher elasticity will obviously generate larger distortions, but this cannot be
captured in the present model.
6 Transition Analysis
In this section, I analyze whether policy can account for the trend in hours worked over time. More
speciﬁcally, I look at Sweden during the period 1960-2002.
The model economy is assumed to start out in a steady state, calibrated with taxes and government
consumption set to their 1960 values. Taxes and government consumption are then changed according
to their observed values for each year, for the period 1960-2002.29 From 2002 and onwards, taxes and
government consumption are held constant at their 2002 values. All preference and production parameters
are the same as in the above analysis. The transition is announced 20 years in advance, and households
have complete information on this path. The result is presented in Fig. 3 below.30 The tax wedge is
29Data on government consumption is taken from European Economy (2000) and SCB at www.scb.se. Data on hours
worked, population and employment 20-64 from the OECD Labor Database. Income taxes are taken from Skattestatistisk
årsbok 2002 (2002). And ﬁnally, the data on payroll taxes and value added taxes is taken from Skattebetalarnas Förening
at www.skattebetalarnas.se.
30The data on average hours worked, employment and population for people between 20 and 64 was again taken from
the OECD Labor Database.
18deﬁned as 1 − (1−θI)(1−θP)
(1+θC)
Figure 3: Average Annual Hours in the Model and the Data between 1960 and 2002.
The model is obviously consistent with the falling trend in hours worked since 1960. Both in the
model and the data, the largest reduction occurs from 1960 until around 1980. This strengthens the
paper’s hypothesis, since this is also the period when taxes increased the most. After 1981 , the trends
for both taxes and actual hours worked seem to be almost ﬂat. This is also what the model predict for
hours worked.
Some statistics are shown in the correlation matrix below. As can be seen, the correlation between
hours worked in the data and the tax wedge is -0.53, and the correlation between hours worked in the
data and the model is 0.52.
Even though the model seems to be consistent with the long-run behavior, it cannot really explain the
short-term movements observed in the data, which is not very surprising, however. The model obviously
abstracts from a number of potentially important features like business cycles. The discrepancy between
1985 and 1990 is, for example, most likely driven by the international boom during this period.
Finally, the model clearly overestimates the number of hours worked between 1960 and 1975. It is
19Table 8: Correlation matrix
HOURS (MODEL) HOURS (DATA) TAX WEDGE
HOURS (DATA) 1 0.52 -0.995
HOURS (DATA) 0.52 1 -0.53
TAX WEDGE -0.995 -0.53 1
not really obvious how to reduce this gap. I have made some experiments with productivity growth, but
that does not seem to improve the ﬁt. However, since the low number of hours worked at the beginning
of the period actually comes from the low employment/population ratio, a more promising way may be
to introduce day-care in some form. I leave this for future research.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
I have analyzed whether cross-country diﬀerences in labor supply could have been generated by hetero-
geneity in policy. The ﬁndings are that policy can account very well for the diﬀerence in average annual
hours worked between Sweden and the U.S. The main distortion comes from taxes in general, and labor
taxes in particular. Even though the Frisch elasticity for labor supply is low in the model, labor taxes
create a substantial output loss. GDP per capita is estimated to be somewhat more than 26 percent
higher with U.S. than with Swedish taxes, due to the fact that labor taxes really inﬂuence the choice
between working in the market and in home production.
On the other hand, neither service taxes nor wage-dispersion seem to be associated with any signiﬁcant
output loss. In fact, the service tax is found to be the least distortionary tax among the set of taxes
analyzed in this paper.
The model is also consistent with the falling trend in hours worked since 1960. The largest reduction
occurs from 1960 until around 1980, both in the model and the data. After the early 1980s, the trends
for both taxes and actual hours worked seem to be almost ﬂat, which is as predicted by the model for
hours worked. However, it clearly overestimates the number of hours worked between 1960 and 1975.
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Robustness and Sensitivity analysis
In this Appendix, I evaluate how sensitive the above results are to some of the assumptions made.
A.1.1 A Higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption
To evaluate the sensitivity to this parameter, I here set γ =1 , i.e. changing the Cobb-Douglas function for
consumption goods and services to a log function. To match the hours worked, the following parameters
were changed to  hp = .42E [ it];η = .5430;ϕ = .0965;a0 = .3832
A.1.2 The distribution of wealth
To check how sensitive the results are to assumptions for the wealth distribution, I here make the extreme
assumption that wealth is equally distributed across households (a gini coeﬃcient of zero).
23Table 9: Hours Worked in the Data and the Model With Services.
DATA MODEL
SWEDEN U.S. SWEDEN U.S.
MARKET WORK 23.88 26.18 23.88 27.57
HOME PRODUCTION 18.76 17.02 18.76 16.35
GDP/CAPITA 1 1.31 1.00 1.17
GDP/CAPITA ADJUSTED - - 1.18 1.35
To match the hours worked, the following parameters were changed to  hp =0 .38E [ it];η = .5521;ϕ =
.8450;a0 = .41. The result is presented in the table below.
Table 10: Hours Worked in the Data and the Model With Services. Wealth Equally Distributed.
DATA MODEL
SWEDEN U.S. SWEDEN U.S.
MARKET WORK 23.88 26.18 23.88 26.66
HOME PRODUCTION 18.76 17.02 18.76 16.33
GDP/CAPITA 1 1.31 1.00 1.11
GDP/CAPITA ADJUSTED - - 1.16 1.28
I have also experimented with earnings uncertainty (which generates an endogenous wealth distribu-
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